


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Journal of Nietzsche Studies

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"warum ich diesen mißrätlichen Satz schuf": Ways of Reading
Nietzsche in the Light of *KGW IX*

MARTIN ENDRES AND AXEL PICHLER

ABSTRACT: When examining Nietzsche's Nachlass from 1885–89, international Nietzsche scholarship still predominantly relies on the Colli/Montinari edition of these writings (the "Nachgelassene Fragmente"), even though a new historico-critical edition of the Nachlass that fulfills the standards of current textual criticism is being published since 2001: *KGW IX*. In this article we want to outline the philological considerations that led to this new critical edition with its "diplomatic transcription" of Nietzsche's late "manuscripts." In a second step, we demonstrate the consequences of *KGW IX* for the interpretation of Nietzsche's Nachlass and his late published writings. It is our aim to show that the complexity of Nietzsche's writing in his sketches and drafts from 1885–89 makes any philosophical approach untenable that ignores this complexity—at least under a philological perspective.

Introduction

No lesser personage than Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, rejecting Karl Schlechta's emphasis on "prudence," due to the dominating use of the subjunctive (Konjunktiv) that characterizes the entire aphorism, writes in his interpretation of the oft-cited introduction of the "will to power" in *BGE* 36 (cf. *KSA* 5, pp. 54–55) that it would be wrong "to interpret a stylistic device as means of objective distancing from the main point."¹ Müller-Lauter supports this hypothesis by comparing the published aphorism with a putative earlier version of it from the Nachlass (cf. *KSA* 11:38[12], pp. 610–11), in which Nietzsche expresses himself "with unambiguous determination," and concludes that "when it comes to the elaboration of Nietzsche's last 'insights,' . . . then, the unpublished text, which is a 'preliminary stage' ['Vorstufe'], should take—as in other cases for other reasons—interpretative precedence over the published version."²

The thesis that Nietzsche's Nachlass has to be given preference philosophically over the published writings and that the form(s) of presentation have to be subordinated to the philosophical content—a view that has been held by some of the most famous interpreters of Nietzsche, including Martin Heidegger, Arthur Danto, Richard Schacht, Günter Abel, and Volker Gerhardt—has been regularly contradicted. A strong objection to this view has been put forth by Claus Zittel in his article on Nietzsche's Nachlass in the *Nietzsche-Handbuch*. Zittel writes:

Basically it should be noted that N. formulated his ideas more thetically in the "Nachlass," which enticed many scholars to reconstruct "final doctrines" out of the isolated notes and to turn these into dogmas. In the published work these supposed doctrines appear, if they do so at all, aesthetically contextualized and are thus mostly expressed ironically and disjointedly and are undermined in many ways. . . . Here N. writes hypothetically, ambiguously, and with complexity; he makes use of numerous allusions and references, by which the individual thoughts are arranged in a complex web of relationships. . . . Therefore the published writings possess, qua form, a higher degree of reflectivity than the posthumous sketches [Aufzeichnungen].³

In this article we would like to follow up on the controversy resulting from these two views—which presents any interpreter of Nietzsche with a general decision—because it serves as an entrée into the historical background of the practices of Nietzsche's editors as much as to the question about the importance and relevance of the new edition of Nietzsche's Nachlass from the period 1885–1889, or *KGW IX*, as scholars usually call this edition, after the section it occupies in the *Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, for suitably interpreting Nietzsche.⁴ Accordingly, this article is divided into four parts. Following this introduction, which offers an initial assessment of the importance of *KGW IX* for the interpretation of a single work of Nietzsche—*Beyond Good and Evil*—by examining the textual genesis of the famous aphorism 36, we give a synopsis of the historical and theoretical background that led to the new edition of Nietzsche's late Nachlass. We then provide a close reading of a manuscript documented in *KGW IX* and offer a proposal for how to philosophically handle the philological status of the writings not published by Nietzsche himself. The last section of the article is dedicated to the question of how the newly transcribed drafts (Entwürfe), which afterward were partially incorporated into the published versions of Nietzsche's writings, can be used for an analysis of the textual genesis of these "final" texts.

The new edition's importance for addressing the question of whether the Nachlass or the published writings are of greater value for an understanding of Nietzsche's thought lies in the fact that this edition offers a third approach that takes the status of the published writings just as seriously as it takes the late Nachlass with its highly specific characteristics. While the 'dispute' between Müller-Lauter and Zittel revives the quarrel, well known since Plato's *Gorgias*, between philosophy understood as a superior science and rhetoric as a systematic investigation of the particular in language, *KGW IX*'s "diplomatic

transcription" allows an alternative approach to Nietzsche's Nachlass.⁵ This approach makes it possible to retrace the formation of the published writings by following the textual witnesses (Textzeugen) and thereby also to exploit the meanings layered into the evolutionary history of texts.

Due to the exceptional individuality that can be reconstructed on the basis of the "topology" ("Topo-Logik") of handwriting, Nietzsche's drafts possess an intangible added value that distinguishes them from the printed text. On the other hand, this added value is potentially undermined by the fact that Nietzsche's preliminary stages (Vorstufen) are handwritten texts and therefore differ from the printed versions by their clearly unfinished character, unless they are a final copy (Reinschrift). According to Ludwig Jäger, precisely this aspect—the openness to "transcriptive processing"—characterizes unpublished handwritten documents.⁶

Of course, such an approach had already been possible for Nietzsche researchers before the release of *KGW IX*. Without it, however, a genetic reading was not easily achieved. For example, to reconstruct the textual genesis of *BGE 36*, one would have either had to visit the archive in Weimar to examine the textual witnesses (Textzeugen) there directly or commit oneself to the exhausting and—owing to the incompleteness of the Nachbericht, the commentary volumes that list corrections to the volumes of the *KGW*—only partially possible reconstruction of the text's genesis with the help of this volume's philological apparatus.

In the case of *BGE 36*, this is of even greater significance, because the record, whose importance is emphasized by Müller-Lauter (sketch, *KSA 11:38*[12], pp. 610–11), emerged from the revision of an even earlier version. This earlier version was not included in the commentary of *KSA* and until the publication of *KGW IX* was only available through the Nachbericht of *KGW VII*, which was published in 1986 (*KGW VII/4.2*, p. 469).⁷ This text can be found on pages 94 and 95 of notebook *W 13*, which Nietzsche used in spring and summer 1885 and then again in early 1886 and whose diplomatic transcription is now published in the fourth volume of *KGW IX* (see. fig. 1a/b).⁸ A look at these pages shows the additional possibilities of this draft (Entwurf)/sketch (Aufzeichnung) to clarify the understanding of the text published by Colli and Montinari, because the earlier draft allows us to follow the genesis of the text later published in *BGE*. This does not mean that the published text would not be accessible by itself but only that by the inclusion of earlier versions genetically related to the text further elements of significance can be assigned to it. These additional meanings do—depending on their own content—contribute to the interpretation of the published text by shaping it even more.

As important is the fact that this very sketch is not—as it was claimed by Müller-Lauter—a Vorstufe of *BGE 36* in a strict sense but only distantly related to the later published version, owing to the fact that Nietzsche used and revised parts of the sketch that was ultimately published as *KSA 11:38*[12] (pp. 610–11; cf. Nachbericht to *KGW IX/9*, p. 70) once again after dictating it but after doing so never used it again.⁹




Fig. 1a

W 13

94

- Und willt ihr auch, was mir die Welt mit sich in den Spiegel zuegt?
- 2 Diese Welt: ein Ungeheuer von Kraft, ohne Anfang, ohne Ende, eine feste Größe von Kraft
die nicht größer, nicht kleiner wird, die sich nicht verträumt, sondern nur wandelt
- 4 als Ganzes unveränderlich groß, ein Haushalt ohne Einbußen u Ausgaben, aber
ebenso ohne Zuwachs, u Einnahmen, vom „Nichts“ umschlossen als von seiner
Grenze, nichts unendlich Ausgedehntes, sondern als bestimmte Kraft eines
bestimmten Raumes eingelegt, und nicht einem Raume, der irgendwo „leer“ ist, son-
dern weder voll, noch leer, vielmehr als Kraft überall, als Spiel von Kräften,
hier sich häufend, dort sich mindernd, ein Meer in sich stür-
mend, u. fluthender Kräfte, ewig sich wandelnd, ewig zurücklaufend, als
mit ungeheuren Jahren der Wiederkehr, mit einer Ebbe u. Fluth der
Gestaltungen, aus den einfachsten in die vielfältigsten hinaustreibend,
aus den stillsten kältesten einförmigsten in die glühendsten, wildesten,
viel sich widersprechendsten, und ebenso aus der Fülle zurückkehrend zum
Einfachen, aus dem Spiel des Kampf Widersprüche in die Lust des
Einklangs, sich selber bejahend noch in dieser Gleichheit seiner Jahre,
sich selber segnend als das, was ewig & wiederkommt, u. kein Mitleid.
u Satz werden, an sich selber kennt — : diese meine dionysische Welt
des Schaffens, u Zerstörens, was hat sie gleich mir diese Welt der
großen Wollüste der Zeugung u. des Todes, ohne Ziel, wenn nicht im
Glück Kreise, ein Ziel liegt, ohne Willen, wenn nicht in dem
immer selber will guten Willen
zurückkehren zum Ringe
hat, nicht auf seiner eigenen
Bahn zu bleiben u sich um sich zu drehen — was hat diese Welt des
dionysischen Spiegels, wie ich sie schaute, seine Seele entgegen,
seinen Spiegel dem Spiegel, sein Gleichniß sein Geheimniß dem Dionysos
Weheimuß?

KSA 11:38, 204–211, zu W 13/2

10. Einleitungswort verändert
11. u. v. m. 13
12. u. v. m. 13
13. u. v. m. 13
14. u. v. m. 13
15. u. v. m. 13
16. u. v. m. 13
17. u. v. m. 13
18. u. v. m. 13
19. u. v. m. 13
20. u. v. m. 13
21. u. v. m. 13
22. u. v. m. 13
23. u. v. m. 13
24. u. v. m. 13
25. u. v. m. 13
26. u. v. m. 13
27. u. v. m. 13
28. u. v. m. 13
29. u. v. m. 13
30. u. v. m. 13
31. u. v. m. 13
32. u. v. m. 13
33. u. v. m. 13
34. u. v. m. 13
35. u. v. m. 13
36. u. v. m. 13
37. u. v. m. 13
38. u. v. m. 13
39. u. v. m. 13
40. u. v. m. 13
41. u. v. m. 13
42. u. v. m. 13
43. u. v. m. 13
44. u. v. m. 13
45. u. v. m. 13
46. u. v. m. 13
47. u. v. m. 13
48. u. v. m. 13
49. u. v. m. 13
50. u. v. m. 13
51. u. v. m. 13
52. u. v. m. 13
53. u. v. m. 13
54. u. v. m. 13
55. u. v. m. 13
56. u. v. m. 13
57. u. v. m. 13
58. u. v. m. 13
59. u. v. m. 13
60. u. v. m. 13
61. u. v. m. 13
62. u. v. m. 13
63. u. v. m. 13
64. u. v. m. 13
65. u. v. m. 13
66. u. v. m. 13
67. u. v. m. 13
68. u. v. m. 13
69. u. v. m. 13
70. u. v. m. 13
71. u. v. m. 13
72. u. v. m. 13
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90. u. v. m. 13
91. u. v. m. 13
92. u. v. m. 13
93. u. v. m. 13
94. u. v. m. 13
95. u. v. m. 13
96. u. v. m. 13
97. u. v. m. 13
98. u. v. m. 13
99. u. v. m. 13
100. u. v. m. 13




Fig. 1b

Before we turn to show how textual witnesses (Textzeugen) can be made fruitful for philosophical interpretation, we still have to answer the questions why Nietzsche's Nachlass was not published in such a form until the beginning of this millennium and what criteria this new edition follows.

Synopsis of the Historical and Theoretical Background of *KGW IX*

The history of the falsification of Nietzsche's texts up until the 1960s is well known and needs not be rehearsed.¹⁰ Much less familiar is the problematic status caused by some basic editorial decisions underlying the *Kritische Gesamtausgabe der Werke*, which was launched in 1967 by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, as

well as the *Kritische Studienausgabe*, based on this edition, which the majority of Nietzsche scholars still uncritically see as the philologically proper basis of their interpretative work.¹¹ In 1982, Montinari formulated one of his main editorial goals, namely, that "the handwritten Nachlass . . . be published in its authentic form."¹² As Davide Giuriato and Sandro Zanetti have convincingly demonstrated, developments in textual criticism since Montinari's death in 1986 have called into question the supposition of an "authentic form":

Montinari's editorial practice in his attempt to reconstruct Nietzsche's records in chronological order had relied on questionable categories, through which Nietzsche's scarcely legible notes, sketches [Aufzeichnungen], and drafts [Entwürfe] were turned into linearized texts in forms such as "preliminary stages" ["Vorstufen"] and fragments. The constitution of the texts of Nietzsche's sketches was thereby based on an interpretational scheme that could not satisfy the demands of making the "authentic . . . form" of these writings accessible.¹³

The problems in *KGW VII* and *VIII* addressed here had already been outlined in 1995 by Wolfram Groddeck and Michael Kohlenbach and were examined in a more systematic manner in 2007 in a *Nietzsche-Studien* article by Beat Röllin and René Stockmar.¹⁴ Their critiques are based on the development of editorial sciences in recent decades.¹⁵ Scholars such as Gunter Martens, Wolfram Groddeck, and Roland Reuß in particular have contributed to these developments. One point of agreement among the otherwise strongly divergent views of these authors is that "the reproduction of the handwriting in the typological set is, even with the most sophisticated printing design, not a pictorial figure ("mimesis"); it is rather the result of a translation ("interpretatio") from a polymorphic into a stereotyped writing system" (*KGW IX/1*, p. xv). The printed text thus does not yet exist; even in the case of a diplomatic transcription, it has to be produced: "Text is therefore always already *constituted* text, that is to say, the moment of unity in literature brought forth with the critical reception and the naiveté of the given is here, as everywhere, especially when it comes to science, out of place."¹⁶

In light of this new understanding of textuality, the following editorial decisions by Colli and Montinari have proved particularly problematic:

1. The division of Nietzsche's writings into text volumes and apparatus volumes. According to Groddeck and Kohlenbach, such a distinction "involuntarily [encourages] a certain direction for both reading and interpretation."¹⁷ Especially in the case of the so-called posthumous fragments, this editorial practice suggested that what was being presented was a complete, accurate, and chronological edition of the Nachlass: "Consecutively numbered and in a strict chronological order, the posthumous fragments established themselves as a particularly easy-to-quote system, and this with all the authority of a printed book."¹⁸

2. The chronological order of the "entire text"/the "posthumous fragments." This gives the false impression of a temporal precision, "which cannot be justified for all cases with the same evidence."¹⁹
3. The linear representation of Nietzsche's sketches.²⁰ Failing to draw the now common distinction between clean copies/printed text and handwritten sketches or drafts in editorial theory and practice, Colli and Montinari dared to contrive—as was still common at the time—linear texts out of handwritten sketches, which falsely gave the impression of unambiguousness.²¹ As Groddeck and Kohlenbach put it, this practice led to a situation in which "more 'Nietzsche texts' have been published than he actually wrote."²²

In summation, this editorial approach promoted the belief that the Colli/Montinari edition was complete and authentic. Especially in regard to authenticity, however, the criteria of German-speaking editorial practice have changed dramatically since the 1970s. Of the current way of treating these kinds of problems, Giuriato and Zanetti state that "authenticity only makes sense in terms of a requirement to disclose underlying presentation principles, as well as the precise documentation of the given material."²³

The editors of *KGW IX* fulfill precisely these requirements by providing facsimiles of the originals as well as a reproduction of the sketches from Nietzsche's late Nachlass that has been integrated into a differentiated transcription, which thus maintains the specific character of the handwritten as a sketch: "Because *KGW IX* documents the late Nachlass in the manner described, it remains readily apparent that the sketches and writing processes do not constitute a linear reading text: the complexity and contextuality of these sketches is clearly evident."²⁴

We briefly demonstrate the consequences of these editorial practices for the reading of Nietzsche's texts. We proceed in two steps. First, given the popular distinction between sketches and linear (printed) text in editorial theory and practice, we offer a close reading of a set of sketches in notepad N VII 2. Second, we return to the textual genesis of the famous aphorism 36 of *Beyond Good and Evil* by looking at the putative earlier version of this same aphorism—the sketch that can be found on pages 94 and 95 of notebook W I 3. Here we briefly outline the significance of this sketch for dealing with Nietzsche's supposedly central "doctrine" of the "will to power" and for assessing its importance in *Beyond Good and Evil*.

N VII 2, p. 153: The Self-Referentiality and Self-Reflexivity of Writing

Conscious of the problems involved in "inventing" a clearly continuous and linear text, we now turn to an analysis of one page of Nietzsche's notebook N VII 2 (*KGW IX/2*). A close reading of the page shows the deep complexity and

internal references that Nietzsche's sketches exhibit. Along with this analysis, we offer a more appropriate methodology for reading the surviving manuscripts and at the same time outline the criteria and particularities of this method that distinguish it from more conventional interpretations of texts.

Though this may seem strange, it is of vital importance for a reading such as the one we wish to summarize here that it initially avoids any interpolations or philosophical presuppositions. Such presuppositions must be set aside as far as possible to prevent us from fulfilling Nietzsche's prophecy in *Ecce homo*, "No one [can] get more out of things, including books, than he already knows" ("Niemand [kann] aus den Dingen, die Bücher eingerechnet, mehr heraushören, als er bereits weiss") (*EH* "Books," 1; *KSA* 6, pp. 299–300).

By no means does such a philological reading require shelving established interpretations of Nietzsche as textually unfounded. Yet a precise and careful *philological* reading offers a textually firmer basis for making general statements about Nietzsche's philosophy in the Nachlass.²⁵ However, such a philological reading is in no way easy—on the contrary, constant reflections on the meaning of the form and the materiality of the written word requires both a high degree of sensitivity and an ongoing scrutiny of one's own conditions of understanding and comprehension. Our claim here is that the self-referentiality in Nietzsche's writing does not primarily affect the question of the nature of language or the problematization of expression but rather the question of the omnipresent self-reference of writing to its material constitution and the meaning that is directly linked to that autodeixis.²⁶

We would like to illustrate such a philological reading by looking mainly at page 153 of N VII 2 and calling attention to some features of the sketches there that have a direct effect on the interpretation of its meaning. A starting point can be found on the lower third of the page. The sketch between lines 32–37 can be seen as the completion of a writing process that extends from page 156 to page 153, that is, backward (see fig. 2a/b).




Fig. 2a

2 Die Zurückführung einer Wirkung auf eine
 4 Ursache ist: zurück auf ein Subjekt.
 6 Alle Veränderungen gelten als hervorgebracht
 8 von Subjekten.

10 – die jetzige Stufe der Moralität

12 fordert 1) keine Strafe!
 14 2) keinen Lohn – { keine
 Vergel-
 tung!
 16 3) keine Servilität
 18 4) keine pia fraus!

20 – wir ertragen den Anblick nicht

22 mehr, folgl. schaffen wir die Sklaven ab

24 ^{Es ist ein Lieblingswort der}
^{u. Zärtlichen, oft auch die} Schläfen u. Gewissenlosen
 Die Weichmüthigen sagen tout comprendre c'est
^{es ist auch eine Dummheit, immer}
 26 tout pardonner! Oh wenn man erst bis auf das
^{es scheint mir, man würde da}
 28 „comprendre“ warten wollte, da käme man
^{zu selten kommen! sollte}
 30 niemals zum Verzeihen! Und zuletzt, warum
^{gerade}
 32 man verzeihen, wenn man begriffen hätte? ^{dieser}
 verzeihen? Gesetzt, ich begriffe ganz u. gar, warum ~~ich~~
 34 Satz mir mißrieth
 diesen mißrathenen Satz schuf, dürfte ich ihn darum
^{– Es giebt Fälle, wo wir einen M. durchstreicht, weil man}
 36 nicht durchstreichen? ~~Ebenso mit einem fehlenden Kinde~~ –
 t. ^{genug} endlich ihn begriffen hat.

2-8: KGW VIII 1[39]
 10-18: KGW VIII 1[40]
 20-22: KGW VIII 1[41]
 23-37: KGW VIII 1[42]

12: 1) z
 29: sollte) z
 37: begriffen] nach unvollständiger Korrektur >
 begriffen

Fig. 2b

dieser

Gesetzt, ich begriffe ganz u. gar, warum ~~ich~~
 Satz mir mißrieth
 diesen mißrathenen Satz schuf, dürfte ich ihn darum
 nicht durchstreichen?

this

Presuming, I would understand completely and utterly, why ~~I~~
 sentence went wrong to me
 created this misbegotten sentence, am I not allowed
 to cross it out just for that?

The interleaving of the materiality of writing and the meaning of what is said is provoked by the word “durchstreichen” (N VII 2, p. 153, l. 36). The revision of the third syntactic unit, “ich diesen mißrathenen Satz schuf,” by *crossing out* and the subsequent sketch of an alternate phrasing on top of the primary text layer are discussed by the sentence itself. Furthermore, this discussion is marked and initiated by a word that itself already expresses a tension between form and content, since “durchstreichen” is underlined for emphasis.

One might argue that this is only a single case that has no significance beyond being a somewhat deliberate coincidence. However, the logic of writing and its self-reference to the entire passage is far more complex. On the one hand, it is noteworthy that the alternate phrasing also causes a change of perspective: in the primary text layer, the syntactic unit is “warum ich diesen mißrathenen Satz schuf” (“why I created this misbegotten sentence”); in the alternate, overlaid phrasing, the sentence “tilts” into the passive voice: “warum mir dieser Satz mißrieth” (“why this sentence went wrong to me”). Along with the reflection about the written text, an inversion in reference takes place: the sentence is mirroring itself; it “reflects” back on itself.

It is decisive that the self-referential and self-reflexive logic of writing does not remain limited to this sentence but also causes a fundamental change in the subsequent sentence. The syntactic unit in the “primary layer” of the next sentence is “Ebenso mit einem fehlenden Kinde—” (“likewise with a missing child—”). However, the second layer reflects directly back onto the previous sentence and its logic.

—Es giebt [genug] Fälle, wo wir einen M. durchstreicht, weil man
 endlich ihn begriffen hat.

—There are [enough] cases where we cross out a P., because you
 finally have understood him.

The sentence defines an action that not only takes place within itself, in that the word “Kinde” is crossed out, but also at a key position in the preceding sentence: crossing out the word “ich” in the third syntactic unit is a further and for this passage crucial “case” of crossing out a “P.” (“person”) [“M.” (“Mensch”)].

The quality of the transcription of the KGW IX in contrast to the constituted text in previous editions of Nietzsche’s Nachlass can be demonstrated impressively by a direct comparison of this passage with the linear text version of KGW

VIII/1 (see fig. 3): The composition of the text that is referred to as fragment 1[42] is such as to prohibit the reenactment of the writing process that we are able to provide through the transcription of Nietzsche's sketch. The distortion is so pervasive that the central semantic value of the sentence (the tension between cross out and underline) is totally obscured by subjecting it to the conventional limitations of printing.

The first result of our philological reading reveals that Nietzsche's writing in this passage is fundamentally characterized by an ongoing reflection on the condition of the possibility of writing itself. What is the relevance of the material constitution of a piece of writing to what is written? What are the criteria of writing? In what way is writing capable of reflecting its own development? Should the logic of writing be considered a call for continued writing or for the revision of what has already been written? Nietzsche's handwritten Nachlass manuscripts generally attest to the complex dialogical writing process these questions imply.

Es ist ein Lieblingswort der
u. Zärtlichen, oft auch die Schläffen u. Gewissenlosen
Die Weichmüthigen sagen tout comprendre c'est
es ist auch eine Dummheit. immer
's tout pardonner: Oh wenn man erst bis auf das
es scheint mir, man würde da
28 „comprendre“ warten wollte, da käme man
es zu selten kommen! sollte
30 niemals zum Verzeihen! Und zuletzt, warum
gerade
man verzeihen, wenn man begriffen hätte? dieser
32 verzeihen? Gesetzt, ich begriffe ganz u. gar, warum ich
Satz mir mißrieth
34 diesen mißrathenen Satz schuf, dürfte ich ihn darum
en nicht durchstreichen? — Es giebt Fälle, wo wir einen M. durchstreicht, weil man
36 Ebenso mit einem fehlenden Kinde —
t. genug endlich ihn begriffen hat.

1 [42]

Es ist ein Lieblingswort der Schläffen und Gewissenlosen
tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner: es ist auch eine Dumm-
heit. Oh wenn man erst immer auf das „comprendre“ warten
s wollte: es scheint mir, man würde da zu selten zum Verzeihen
kommen! Und zuletzt, warum sollte man gerade verzeihen,
wenn man begriffen hätte? Gesetzt, ich begriffe ganz und gar,
warum dieser Satz mir mißrieth, dürfte ich ihn darum nicht
durchstreichen? — Es giebt Fälle, wo man einen Men-
schen durchstreicht, weil man ihn begriffen hat.

Fig. 3

We have far from comprehensively analyzed the self-reflexive references of page 153 of notebook N VII 2, and so we would like to conclude with a closer look at another passage on this same page that is of general relevance to Nietzsche's writing in the Nachlass and its materiality. It concerns the sentence in lines 23–26, which after deletions and insertions to the second level can be reproduced here verbatim:

Es ist ein Lieblingswort der Schläffen u. Gewissenlosen
tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner: [. . .]

It is the favorite word of slumbering and unscrupulous people
tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner: [. . .]

The sentence has a remarkable aspect: the expression "*tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner*" is not signaled to be a foreign expression in the sentence sequence by quotation marks but merely by a change in the writing system from German to Latin script, which was normally only used to indicate a word with a Latin origin or a word from a Romance language. Also, one would expect a colon to precede the French phrase, yet here this punctuation mark follows only *after* the unquoted phrase. The expression invokes not only a multiplicity of intertexts, since it is not only to be found in an article by Henrich Heine from May 19, 1841, the first known source of the expression, but also in variations in Tolstoy's *War and Peace* (1868), and by Goethe in *Torquato Tasso* (1790) and *West-Eastern Divan* (1819), in Madame de Stäel's *Corinne ou l'Italie* (1807), and in a letter written by Theodor Fontane dated August 18, 1876. However, the local context of the sentence itself is much more relevant than the intertextual references: although the expression is associated with "slumbering" and "unscrupulous" people, it refers to its own author through its integration into the sentence without quotation marks, thereby incorporating him into the circle of the accused.

Again, this is not made transparent in the linear version of *KGW* VIII, since the distinction between German and Latin script is simply ignored (see fig. 3). Only in the transcription of *KGW* IX can this central aspect of expression in Nietzsche's writing become visible: the fundamental and omnipresent tension for Nietzsche between self and others, one's own speech and others' speech, the common and the individual, adherence to conventions and innovative transgression, or conformity and singularity, are even represented in his choice of writing system. The tension, which in Nietzsche's sketches already find expression in the choice of script, becomes as a result exponentially complex, since the transcription of *KGW* IX distinguishes between autograph manuscripts and dictations, and so the tension is replicated on a second level. One has to ask on a case-by-case basis whether a change of script was explicitly ordered by Nietzsche or whether the stenographer was "slavishly" sticking to the conventions of the time. A decision cannot always be reached, and in certain cases both options are equally plausible, so that the particular ramifications of each is worth exploring and developing in detail.

In sum, readers of Nietzsche's Nachlass are exhorted to pay close attention to the complexity of his manuscripts—and that means to remind themselves of the central themes that fundamentally shape Nietzsche's writing: that is, it means to reflect on the condition of possibility of writing in the framework of the written text. The editors of *KGW IX* have followed this advice and created a new textual basis that enables the readers to do the same.

Notebook W I 3, pages 94 to 95, and the “Will to Power”
in *Beyond Good and Evil*

If one turns back now to the putative preliminary stage (Vorstufe) of *BGE* 36 and recalls the importance of self-referentiality and self-reflexivity in Nietzsche's writing, one will quickly see the philosophical relevance of the writing process manifested in this autograph entry for an analysis of the meaning of the "will to power" in *Beyond Good and Evil*: it will be noticed immediately that in this version, the phrase "will to power" is nowhere to be found (see fig. 1a/b). And that in particular, the famous ending of the notation 38[12] is missing—"This world is the will to power—and nothing else! And you yourselves too are this will to power—and nothing else!" ("*Diese Welt ist der Wille zur Macht—und nichts außerdem! Und auch ihr selber seid dieser Wille zur Macht—und nichts außerdem!*") (KSA 11:38[12], p. 611). This alone presents a reading such as Müller-Lauter's with great difficulties, since it claims that on the subject of Nietzsche's "final insights," the Nachlass are often preferable to published versions. Does the fact that the will to power is not mentioned in the manuscript mean, then, that in this case one is not dealing with such an insight and that one also has to read the "will to power" in *Beyond Good and Evil* on the basis of the clear allusions to "eternal recurrence" that can be found in the draft?

If so, such an attempt would entail a renewed acceptance of the problematic view that one is dealing with a finished text here. But, as the discussion of page 153 of N VII 2 shows, it is just not true that we are dealing with a finished text in the case of Nietzsche's sketches and drafts. Instead of choosing one of the alleged versions over another, it is more reasonable to follow the textual genesis from the earliest drafts to the ultimately published version, which allows us to thereby trace the semantic constants and shifts in the text's reflection and revision process. We would recommend as the starting point for this process the published text or the work containing this text, because only these possess an authorized final textual status in a traditional sense. This approach relies on an understanding of text that has its origins in Aristotle's notion of *ergon* and that has been picked up by recent German editorial scholars such as Roland Reuß as being an ordered set of written linguistic elements that can be easily read out aloud and that possess a certain unified meaning.²⁷

In the case of an attempt to reconstruct the textual genesis of *BGE* 36, obviously one also has to incorporate the later adaptations of pages 94 to 95 of notebook *W I 3*, which have recently been transcribed by Beat Rölli. These include sheets 31/32 and 33/33^a written by Louise Röder-Wiederhold, as dictated by Nietzsche (which can be found in folder [Mappe, abbreviated Mp] *XVI 1*) and the genetically only relevant sketch on pages 646 to 647 of *KS A 11:40*[37] (which now can be found in the transcription of notebook *W I 7* [*KGW IX/4*; *W I 7*, p. 57; see fig. 4]), as well as the print manuscript (Druckmanuskript)—that is to say, the handwritten version of the book's text that Nietzsche sent to the editor.²⁸ However, such an approach covers only the paradigmatic levels of meaning and

			57	W17
	Genutzt, daß uns nichts anderes „gegeben“ ist als unsere Welt der Triebe eben			
	daß wir zu keiner anderen „Realität“ hinauf oder hinauf können, als zur R. der Triebe – denn Denken, in our ein			
	Sollte nicht es genügen, uns als „Kraft“ eine Einheit zu denken, in der Verhalten dieser Triebe zu einander – =		2	
	Wollen Fühlen u. Denken noch ungemischt und ungeschieden sind? Und		3	
	die organ. Wesen als Ansätze zur Trennung, so daß die org. Funk- tionen sämtlich noch in jener Einheit beieinander sind, also Selbstre-		4	
	gulation, Assimilation, Ernährung, Ausscheidung, Stoffwechsel? Zuletzt ist als		10	
	„real“ nichts gegeben als Denken u. Empfinden u. Triebe: Ist es nicht		12	
	den Versuch zu machen u. die Frage der Fragen ob doch nicht daraus erlaubt zu verstehen, ob dies „Gegebene“ nicht ausreicht die Welt zu		14	
	eine Täuschung			
	konstruieren? Ich meine nicht als Schein: sondern als so sein, wie Scheitern, was		16	
	als ich u. hat etwa das vom gleichen Realitäts-Ränge			
	eben“ unser Wollen Fühlen Denken ist – eine als primitivere Form des Willens		18	
	in der noch Alles in Eins beschließen liegt, was sich später abzweigt u. ausgliedert. Auf w. der Welt der Triebe			
	Die Frage ist zuletzt: ob wir den Willen wirklich als Bewegung anerkennen? ob wir an die Gesamtheit des Willens glauben?		20	
	Thun wir dies, so kann er natürlich nur auf etwas wirken, was seiner Art an-empfohlenen müssen wir den Versuch machen, die W. u. als zu einzuge zu lassen		22	Was
	Ist u. nicht auf „Stoffe“. Entweder muß man alle Wirkung als ill. Wirkens nur		24	
	lustion auffassen (denn wir haben uns die Vorstellung von Ursache u. Wir- kung nur nach dem Vorbilde unseres Willens als Ursache gebildet!) u. dann		26	
	ist gar nichts begrifflich: oder man muß versuchen, sich alle Wirkungen als gleicher Art, wie Willensakte zu denken, also die Hypothese machen,		32	
	ob nicht alles mechanische Geschehen, insofern eine Kraft darin ist, eben u. Vorwegung		34	
	Willenskraft ist. – unser gesamten Triebleben als die Ausgestaltung einer Grundform des Willens zu erklären – nämlich			
	gesetzt, daß man alle org. Funktionen des Willens zur Macht, wie es mein Satz ist –			
	Die „sterblichen Seelen“ resp. die Unmöglichkeit, das numerische Ver- hältnis auf diese Dinge zu übertragen. Gegen das Individuum. Das		38	
	überhaupt = Kraft eindeutig zu bestimmen als W z. M.		40	
	„Zählen“ ist nur eine Vereinfachung, wie alle Begriffe. Nämlich: überall		42	
	wo etwas rein arithmetisch gedacht werden soll, wird die Qualität weggerechnet.		44	
	Ebenso in allem Logischen, wo die Identität der Fälle die Voraussetzung ist, also der eigentl. Charakter jedes Vorgangs einmal weggedacht ist (das Neue, nicht aus den Bedingungen des Entstehens Zu-Begreifende.)		46	
			50	

Fig. 4

textual genesis for the aphorism; given the characteristic contextualization of concepts in Nietzsche's writings, it has to be complemented by a syntagmatic investigation, that is, an analysis of the semantic web arising from the position of the aphorism in the published work.²⁹ Such a reading would have to investigate the meaning of the subjunctives ("Konjunktive") and other textual elements, which potentially undermine any ontological reading of the aphorism, as well as the position of the aphorism itself within *Beyond Good and Evil*.³⁰

Such a comprehensive analysis is by far beyond the scope of this article. However, we would at least like to point out the most distinctive characteristics of pages 94 to 95 of notebook W I 3. These include in particular the fact that the entry accords with that very folding into oneself ("in-sich-hinein-Faltung") qua self-reflection that we have detected in the handwriting of N VII 2. In contrast to that detectable self-reflection, which is incorporated into the writing process itself, the folding inward hinted at on pages 94 to 95 of W I 3 takes place through the complex semantic interplay between the deictic dimensions of the pronoun "this" ("diese"; see fig. 1a/b) and its relation to the intratextual "I" that dominates the entire entry. This can be seen by looking at the beginning and the end of the sketch. By so doing, we can recognize how the leading motif of the "circle" ("Ring") becomes the central structural feature of the entry itself. The entry starts with the question "—And do you know what the world is to me? Shall I show it to you in the mirror?" ("—Und wißt ihr auch, was mir die Welt ist? Soll ich sie euch im Spiegel zeigen?") (see fig. 1a/b) and already answers the question in the subsequent sentence: "The[is] world: a monster of force, without beginning, without end, a firm, iron quantity of force [. . .]" ("Die[se] Welt: ein Ungeheuer von Kraft, ohne Anfang, ohne Ende, eine feste ehernen Größe von Kraft [. . .]") (see fig. 1a/b). This opening is replayed again in the rhetorical questions at the end of the sketch whereby the circle it traversed is closed. The entry ends as follows: "Do you know now what this world is to me? And what I want when I want this world?" ("Wißt ihr nun, was mir die Welt ist? Und was ich will, wenn ich diese Welt—will?") (see fig. 1a/b). The underlining of "I" and "this" particularly ties this question back to the first sentence, which opens with the voice of this very "I" and is followed up by a first description of "this world." The circular structure presented here is not only an expression of performative writing—which is also manifested in the intensive reworking of those passages in the middle of the entry that describe the "~~blessed circle of becoming~~" ("~~seligen Ringes des Werdens~~") (see fig. 1a/b)—but also seems to imply a shift in the referentiality of the deictic "this": "this" ultimately refers only to itself, that is to say to the blueprint of the world outlined in the text, but not to "the world" (our emphasis), as the phrase that appears in the first draft (see fig. 1a/b).

In the version dictated to Louise Röder-Wiederhold, this autoreferential circular structure is reinforced by the fact that Nietzsche puts "the world" from

the first sentence of W I 3 on page 94 in quotation marks and underlines "the world" in the penultimate question—"Do you know now what the world is to me?" ("Wißt ihr nun, was mir die Welt ist?").³¹ Otherwise Nietzsche makes no further changes at either the beginning or the end of the text. There is also nowhere in this dictation an explicit mention of the "will to power." It can only be found in a later revision of the dictation (cf. Mp XVI, Bl. 32r).³² This revised version ends with the famous "This world is the will to power—and nothing else! And you yourselves too are this will to power—and nothing else!" ("Diese Welt ist der Wille zur Macht—und nichts außerdem! Und auch ihr selber seid dieser Wille zur Macht—und nichts außerdem!") (Mp XVI, Bl. 32r, transcribed by Beat Röllin, translated by us).³³ According to Röllin, this revision "date[s] to (i) later than the dictations and (ii) because it is written in purple ink, to earlier than the end of September—that is June to mid-September 1885."³⁴ In the print manuscript these sentences are already in the "subjunctive" mood:

[G]esetzt, daß man alle organischen Funktionen auf diesen Willen zur Macht zurückführen könnte und in ihm auch die Lösung des Problems der Zeugung und Ernährung—es ist Ein Problem—fände, so hätte man damit sich das Recht verschafft, alle wirkende Kraft eindeutig zu bestimmen als: Wille zur Macht. Die Welt von innen gesehen, die Welt auf ihren 'intelligiblen Charakter' hin bestimmt und bezeichnet—sie wäre eben 'Wille zur Macht' und nichts außerdem.—

That "this world" of the notebook W I 3 and the revised drafts is to be understood as Nietzsche's "last insight"—in the sense of a dogmatically fixed ontology—thus appears questionable.

Regardless of whether one follows our rather bold thesis that the nature of the will to power in *BGE* 36 is purely virtual, the account we have just delivered of the textual genesis should make clear that a determination of its status within *Beyond Good and Evil* that excludes its constituent textuality can lay no claim to being a comprehensive coverage of the text's meaning.³⁵ This article should clearly show that treating Nietzsche's sketches as the equivalent of published texts which leads Müller-Lauter and many others to recklessly combine published and unpublished material in their readings, has to be considered—at least from a philological point of view—as unscientific. An adequate understanding of the interplay of published and unpublished material is only possible if one sticks as closely as possible to the actual manuscripts. In regard to the preliminary stages of Nietzsche's writing, neither *KSA* nor any translation that follows this edition allow this proximity to the source. It is only possible by using *KGW* IX.

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NOTES

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1. Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, *Über Werden und Wille zur Macht: Nietzsche-Interpretationen*, vol. 1 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1999), 35. All translations are ours unless otherwise indicated.

2. Müller-Lauter, *Über Werden und Wille zur Macht*, 36.

3. Claus Zittel, "Nachlass 1880–1885," in *Nietzsche-Handbuch*, ed. Henning Ottmann (Stuttgart: Metzler, 2000), 138–39. It was common in German Nietzsche scholarship until the release of *KGW IX* to call all of Nietzsche's posthumous writings "posthumous fragments" ("Nachgelassene Fragmente"). Due to the edition, which showed that Nietzsche's posthumous writings did not only not fulfill the requirements for "fragments"—at least in a strict sense—but also could not be considered "finished texts," this term was replaced by "Notat" or "Aufzeichnung." To underline these characteristics we decided to translate these two terms, which are synonymously used in German scholarship as "sketch." For the German "Entwurf" we use "draft" and for the word "Notiz" "note."

4. The edition of *KGW IX* we reference throughout is Friedrich Nietzsche, *Kritische Gesamtausgabe Werke*, Section IX, *Der handschriftliche Nachlaß ab Frühjahr 1885 in differenzierter Transkription*, ed. Marie-Luise Haase and Michael Kohlenbach (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2001). All the figures of *KGW IX* are reprinted with the permission of the publisher.

5. The technical term "diplomatic transcription" is widespread in current editorial scholarship. Peter L. Shilingsburg defines it as follows: "A rendering machine-produced form (typing or typeset) of the entire content of a manuscript, marked proof, or annotated text, including cancellations and additions" (*Scholarly Editing in the Computer Age: Theory and Practice*, 3rd ed. [Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998], 174).

6. Ludwig Jäger, "Störung und Transparenz: Skizze zur performativen Logik des Medialen," in *Performativität und Medialität*, ed. Sybille Krämer (Munich: Fink 2004), 46.

7. For a non-German speaker such a reconstruction of the textual genesis of *BGE* 36 has been almost impossible. Such a reader finds sketch 38[12] as aphorism 1067 of Walter Kaufmann's translation of *The Will to Power*. Also the new edition of Nietzsche's late fragments presents this sketch in a linearized version and does not give any hints about its multiple revisions (Friedrich Nietzsche, *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, ed. Rüdiger Bittner [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003], 38–39). In this edition, the very last sentence of this sketch together with *GM II:12* and fragment 14[121] that Nietzsche wrote two years later—in spring 1888 to be precise—even turns into a central document of Bittner's reading of Nietzsche: "The interesting suggestion here is that will to power should be understood . . . as a uniform kind of source of whatever happens in the organic world" (introduction to *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, xx). The problematic philological status of such a reading does not have to be emphasized specifically.

8. According to Beat Röllin's reconstruction of Nietzsche's work plans for the summer of 1885, the two pages form part of the second "layer of inscriptions, written in purple ink" in the notebook, which Nietzsche filled from back to front: "The records on the pages 112/113–86 constitute successively redesigned templates for the middle and late dictations (the so-called Folioblätter); hence they were written between June and July 1885" ("Die Aufzeichnungen S. 112/113–86 stellen sukzessive neu konzipierte Vorlagen zu den mittleren und späten Diktaten (Folioblätter) dar; sie entstanden folglich Mitte Juni bis Anfang Juli 1885") (*Nietzsches Werkpläne vom Sommer 1885: Eine Nachlass-Lektüre* [Munich: Fink, 2012], 31).

9. This irritating fact was verbally confirmed to Axel Pichler by Beat Röllin, who forms part of the group of philologists currently working on *KGW IX* in Weimar and Basel.

10. See Mazzino Montinari, "Nietzsches Nachlaß von 1885 bis 1888 oder Textkritik und Wille zur Macht," in his *Nietzsche lesen* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1982), 92–119, Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, "Der Wille zur Macht" als Buch der 'Krisis' philosophischer Nietzsche-Interpretation," *Nietzsche-Studien* 24 (1995): 223–60.

Since the debate reconstructed here and its practical editorial consequences has received very little attention in anglophone Nietzsche scholarship, we have decided, contrary to common writing conventions, to reproduce the relevant German-speaking contributions verbatim, thereby introducing the reader not familiar with it to the discussion and its communicative practice.

11. The following critique of some of the editorial decisions of the founders of Nietzsche's complete works is in no way meant to diminish their achievements in and for Nietzsche scholarship. As the following section shows, the problematic editorial principles exposed here are based far more on the state of the art of philological practices at the date of the commencement of the *KGW* edition than on wrong decisions made by the two editors. Also, all participants of the *KGW IX* edition tirelessly point out the merits of the two Italian philologists (Beat Röllin et al., "Der späte Nietzsche"—Schreibprozess und Heftedition," in *Schreibprozesse*, ed. Peter Hughes et al. [Munich: Fink, 2008], 103–15). It is also important at this point to draw the reader's attention to the fact that the *Kritische Studienausgabe* exceeds the *KGW* in quantity of philological errors.

12. Montinari, "Nietzsches Nachlaß von 1885 bis 1888," 118–19.

13. Davide Giuriato and Sandro Zanetti, "Von der Löwenklaue zu den Gänsefüßchen: Zur neuen Edition von Nietzsches handschriftlichem Nachlaß ab Frühjahr 1885," *Text: Kritische Beiträge* 8 (2003): 90–91.

14. Wolfram Groddeck and Michael Kohlenbach, "Zwischenüberlegungen zur Edition von Nietzsches Nachlaß," *Text: Kritische Beiträge* 1 (1995): 21–39; Beat Röllin and René Stockmar, "Aber ich notiere mich, für mich"—die IX. Abteilung der Kritischen Gesamtausgabe von Nietzsches Werken," *Nietzsche-Studien* 36 (2007): 22–40. See also Röllin et al., "Der späte Nietzsche." The first paper that actually dealt with these specific editorial problems was Groddeck's "'Vorstufe' und 'Fragment': Zur Problematik einer traditionellen textkritischen Unterscheidung in der Nietzsche-Philologie," in *Textkonstitution bei mündlicher und bei schriftlicher Überlieferung*, ed. Martin Stern (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1991), 165–75.

15. Röllin and Stockmar, "Aber ich notiere mich, für mich," 22.

16. Roland Reuß, "Text, Entwurf, Werk," *Text: Kritische Beiträge* 10 (2005): 9.

17. Groddeck and Kohlenbach, "Zwischenüberlegungen zur Edition von Nietzsches Nachlaß," 27.

18. Röllin and Stockmar "Aber ich notiere mich, für mich," 24.

19. Groddeck and Kohlenbach, "Zwischenüberlegungen zur Edition von Nietzsches Nachlaß," 28.

20. Groddeck and Kohlenbach, "Zwischenüberlegungen zur Edition von Nietzsches Nachlaß," 34ff.

21. See Reuß, "Text, Entwurf, Werk," 1–12.

22. Groddeck and Kohlenbach, "Zwischenüberlegungen zur Edition von Nietzsches Nachlaß," 32.

23. Giuriato and Zanetti, "Von der Löwenklaue zu den Gänsefüßchen," 92.

24. Röllin et al., "Der späte Nietzsche," 104; Röllin and Stockmar, "Aber ich notiere mich, für mich," 26.

25. That is to say, we are not pleading for a *unique* interpretation of Nietzsche's texts, but—on the contrary—for a methodology of reading that foremost reveals the complexity of their meaning, a complexity of which every interpretation should be aware.

26. This specific interaction between philosophical thinking and writing does not amount to a rephrasing of a Derridean "undecidability" between philosophy and literature (see Bernd Magnus, "Nietzsche and Postmodern Criticism," *Nietzsche-Studien* 18 [1989]: 307), nor is it a simple reformulation of an analysis of Nietzsche's "metaphoric" or "poetic" style. On the one hand, we indeed agree that "Nietzsche's writings resist *paraphrase* and they do so in a special way" (Bernd Magnus, Stanley Stewart, and Jean-Pierre Mileur, *Nietzsche's Case: Philosophy as/and Literature* [New York: Routledge, 1993], 16), and we share the view that the philosophical

topics in Nietzsche are always (co)constituted by (the use of) language itself. On the other hand, we distance ourselves from a simplistic "poststructuralist" point of view by offering a philological method of reading that respects the individuality and (especially) the *materiality* of the written text, which is typically ignored.

27. See Reuß, "Text, Entwurf, Werk." This point about the linguistic unity of Nietzsche's texts has already been made by Paul van Tongeren from a perspective purely internal to Nietzsche scholarship; see his *Reinterpreting Modern Culture: An Introduction to Friedrich Nietzsche's Philosophy* (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2000), 64. As a part of his examination of Nietzsche's writing practices, van Tongeren admits, after having referred to the semantic valence and more complex formation of the published texts in a similar way as Claus Zittel, that the earlier drafts can likewise help illuminate this complexity: "The many sketches and plans we find in his 'unpublished notes' make clear that he did not simply publish his notes as he initially wrote them down, but that he worked on them, rewrote them, changed them, polished them" (68). Nevertheless for van Tongeren—as for Zittel—the final, that is, published, version remains the text to interpret. For recent German-language scholarship dealing with Nietzsche reading, see Axel Pichler, "Lektüremethoden der Nietzsche-Forschung," in *Nietzsche Online* (2011), DOI: 10.1515/NO_W_Themen_0001, www.degruyter.com/db/nietzsche.

28. This print manuscript (Druckmanuskript), which covers 108 sheets and is stored at the archive in Weimar (cf. *GSA* 71/26), also contains several significant revisions. For example "as real" is added in the first sentence: "Assuming that nothing else is 'given' as real" ("Gesetzt, dass nichts Anderes als real 'gegeben' ist") (*BGE* 36; *KSA* 5, p. 54). This addition strengthens the connection between this "nothing else" and the "reality," which appears in quotation marks in the following clause. There are dozens of such deletions and insertions.

29. Herman Siemens and Paul van Tongeren have brought to light that Nietzsche's writing practices are particularly characterized by the creation of a plurality of meanings: "Not only does the meaning of certain words change with the development of his thought; more than most philosophers, he consciously works with the possibility of ascribing different meanings to the same words through differing contextualizations and the deployment of various optics" ("Das Nietzsche-Wörterbuch: Anatomy of a 'großes Projekt,'" in *Nietzsche—Macht—Größe*, ed. Volker Casya and Konstanze Schwarzwald [Berlin: de Gruyter, 2012], 448). On Nietzsche's practice of contextualization and its consequences for a philologically "adequate" treatment of his texts, see also Werner Stegmaier, "After Montinari: On Nietzsche Philology," *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, no. 38 (2009): 5–16.

A complex semantic interaction can be found between *BGE* 36 and the flanking aphorisms *BGE* 35, *BGE* 37, and *BGE* 38: these three texts offer the reader a number of means for questioning the central thesis of *BGE* 36. While *BGE* 37 does so by a simple association with the divine, which at least "in a popular idiom" ("populär geredet") (*BGE* 37; *KSA* 5, p. 56) mostly appears in a morally problematic light in Nietzsche's writings, *BGE* 38 does so by a historical example, whose main hypothesis is that due to the passion of the interpreters "the text finally disappeared under the interpretation" ("der Text unter der Interpretation verschwand") (*BGE* 38; *KSA* 5, p. 56). The question of interpretation here offers a direct intertextual reference to the second important presentation of the "will to power" in the first book (Hauptstück) of *Beyond Good and Evil*, *BGE* 22, which is also highly ambiguous and finishes with the famous sentences: "Supposing that this also is only interpretation—And you will be eager enough to make this objection?—well, so much the better" ("Gesetzt, dass auch dies nur Interpretation ist—und ihr werdet eifrig genug sein, dies einzuwenden?—nun, um so besser.—") (*BGE* 22; *KSA* 5, p. 37).

30. In the context of the outline of possible interpretations of Nietzsche in light of *KGW* IX, it is not possible to deal with the huge number of older interpretations of *BGE* 36 and the "will to power" in the context of *Beyond Good and Evil*. A good introduction to these issues, dealing especially with various interpreters' handling of the subversive writing practices of Nietzsche in their presentations of the "will to power" in *Beyond Good and Evil*, is provided

by Jakob Dellinger, "Zwischen 'Meinung' und 'Maske': Überlegungen zum Umgang mit Nietzsches Techniken der Subversion," *Nietzscheforschung* 19.1 (2012): 311–20, and "Vorspiel, Subversion und Schleife: Zur Inszenierung des 'Willens zur Macht' in Jenseits von Gut und Böse," in *Texturen des Denkens: Nietzsches Inszenierung der Philosophie in Jenseits von Gut und Böse*, ed. Marcus Born and Axel Pichler (Berlin: de Gruyter, forthcoming).

31. See the transcription in Röllin, *Nietzsches Werkpläne vom Sommer 1885*, 214–15.

32. See Röllin, *Nietzsches Werkpläne vom Sommer 1885*, 119–20.

33. Röllin, *Nietzsches Werkpläne vom Sommer 1885*, 119.

34. Röllin, *Nietzsches Werkpläne vom Sommer 1885*, 119 n. 28.

35. A much more extensive representation of the "virtual" nature of the "will to power" in Nietzsche's post-Zarathustra writings—based on a completely different approach of reading—can be found in Axel Pichler, *Nietzsche, die Orchestikologie und das dissipative Denken* (Wien: Passagen, 2010), 179–90, which tries to show that the will to power's virtuality coincides with Nietzsche's rejection of any form of metaphysical ontology. Instead of coming up with a final ontological interpretation, Nietzsche's "will to power" fulfills the necessity of justification by offering context-shaped and problem-oriented "virtual ontologies," or, as Werner Stegmaier has called them, case-oriented "counterdoctrines" ("Anti-Lehren," in *Also sprach Zarathustra*, ed. Volker Gerhardt [Berlin: Akademie, 2000], 191–224). These virtual ontologies identify and assess the prevailing interpretations and thereby form the basis of follow-up reevaluations.

For further applications of the way the textuality of Nietzsche's texts informs their meaning, which we have only been able to illustrate in preliminary fashion here, consult the first volume of Wolfram Groddeck's textual genetic edition of the *Dionysos-Dithyramben* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1991). A genesis of the earlier versions of *BGE* 36 as well as of the drafts of those earlier versions would need to directly tie into Beat Röllin's reconstruction of Nietzsche's work plans from summer 1885 and ultimately would probably not be less voluminous than Röllin's excellent philological study. In this respect, the sketch given here is only to be understood as a first step toward an adequate dealing with earlier versions of later published texts.